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THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PLANS






The ﬁ  nancial crisis which began in 2007 worsened dra-
matically in the autumn of 2008, culminating in the most 
serious global economic recession of the post-war period. 
Moreover, the consequences of that recession are in turn 
threatening to aggravate the ﬁ  nancial crisis. It is therefore 
vital to ward off that threat and ensure that this crisis does 
not turn into a protracted global depression.
The seriousness of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and the economic 
recession and the scale of the accompanying risks 
prompted the economic policy makers to take swift and 
resolute action. Thus, governments and central banks 
took various measures to support the ﬁ  nancial  sector, 
which was in danger of collapse. Efforts were made to 
protect deposits and avert a looming credit crunch. In 
parallel with these measures, monetary policy was eased 
signiﬁ  cantly throughout the world, a move made possible 
by the sharp decline in inﬂ  ation expectations and risks. 
On the ﬁ   scal policy front, numerous countries devised 
measures in the form of economic recovery plans which, 
together with the automatic stabilisers, were intended to 
counteract falling demand.
This article looks at the economic recovery plans. The 
attempt to use ﬁ   scal measures to kick-start economic 
growth is laudable, but the question is whether that 
goal is actually being achieved. The ﬁ   rst chapter aims 
to deﬁ  ne a ﬁ  scal policy which could offer an appropri-
ate response to the crisis, on the basis of the theoretical 
framework of ﬁ  scal activism and the ﬁ  ndings of empirical 
studies on the subject. The second chapter describes the 
recent economic recovery plans of the United States and 
those of the European Union and its Member States, 
including Belgium. The third chapter comments on these 
various plans. The article ends by drawing a number of 
conclusions.
1.  Effectiveness and limits of an 
anticyclical ﬁ  scal policy
1.1  Theoretical background
A lively debate is in progress on the appropriate role of 
ﬁ   scal policy in steering the business cycle, principally 
during an economic recession phase. Recovery measures 
are mostly presented as a way of attenuating the unwel-
come effects of a slowdown or an economic recession, 
such as rising unemployment. That is particularly true if 
those effects are not conﬁ  ned to purely cyclical phenom-
ena but also impair the economy’s growth potential. One 
example concerns the ‘hysteresis’ effects on unemploy-
ment, where the unemployed lose hope of ﬁ  nding  a 
new job, and cyclical unemployment is liable to become 
structural. In such circumstances, governments may try to 
stimulate economic activity via both their expenditure and 
their revenue. Fiscal measures may provide a direct boost 
to economic growth via increased consumption or public 
investment, but they may also have an indirect effect, 
e.g. by augmenting household purchasing power via tax 
cuts or an increase in welfare beneﬁ  ts. The effectiveness 
and desirability of such demand management by the 
*  The authors would like to thank Wim Melyn for his contribution to the 
production of this article.
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government on the basis of the theories of John Maynard 
Keynes call for a number of comments.
First, it is important for such recovery measures to be 
timely in their effects, otherwise their impact might 
only become apparent after the cyclical upturn and the 
measures would become procyclical. In reality, all kinds 
of delays may occur, originating in particular from the 
political decision-making process, not only at the stage 
of identifying the economic slowdown but also when the 
measures are implemented.
Second, measures to support demand must, by deﬁ  nition, 
be temporary and must be neutralised as soon as the 
economy picks up. Experience has also shown that, for 
policy makers, it is far more attractive to implement such 
recovery measures than to abolish them. There is there-
fore a possibility that “temporary” recovery measures 
may become permanent, causing the structural budget 
position to deteriorate.
Third, it is important that budget resources intended to 
stimulate the economy should be allocated correctly, and 
that recovery measures should be deﬁ  ned and established 
on the basis of objective criteria, taking account of gen-
eral well-being. Nonetheless, it is hard to ensure that the 
measures cannot be distorted by various private interests 
and pressure groups. If that happens, the government 
measures become less effective.
In addition, the effectiveness of the recovery package is 
largely determined by the response of private economic 
agents. In that regard, various factors may undermine 
that effectiveness. Thus, the effectiveness of tax cuts or 
increases in household allowances may be diminished if, 
owing to the uncertainty surrounding their future ﬁ  nan-
cial situation, the households choose to set aside a large 
percentage of the resulting additional resources. Similarly, 
tax cuts for businesses do not necessarily cause ﬁ  rms to 
step up their investment, or recruit or retain more staff. 
In uncertain times, ﬁ  rms may prefer to devote the result-
ing additional resources to strengthening their balance 
sheet, especially if they face substantial excess capacity as 
a result of a sharp fall in demand. In the economic litera-
ture, this type of reaction – which may considerably impair 
the effectiveness of a ﬁ  scal stimulatory policy – is known 
as a “non-Keynesian effect”.
It must also be borne in mind that a deterioration in the 
budget situation and increased government borrowing 
exert upward pressure on interest rates and thus com-
promise the effectiveness of the recovery package. These 
inhibiting effects can be attenuated if the ﬁ  scal policy is 
accompanied by an accommodating monetary policy.
Finally, the degree of openness of the economy is an 
essential factor : if the import ratio is high, all other things 
being equal, the impact of a given ﬁ   scal measure on 
domestic activity growth will obviously be smaller than in 
the case of a low import ratio.
For these reasons, it is essential to assess which elements 
will determine the reactions of private economic agents 
to the ﬁ   scal stimuli. Apart from general conﬁ  dence  in 
the economy, the credibility of ﬁ   scal policy also plays 
a decisive role. Doubts over the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances may in fact render consumers and investors even 
more cautious, and lead to non-Keynesian reactions. The 
proportion of households and businesses facing con-
straints on liquidity or credit is another important factor. 
The greater that proportion – which in principle rises in a 
period of economic recession – the more likely it is that 
the tax incentives will trigger consumption and invest-
ment expenditure, reinforcing the effectiveness of ﬁ  scal 
activism.
The conclusion is therefore that the theoretical basis for 
the anticyclical ﬁ  scal policy is not clear cut. In any case, 
during an economic recession, a recovery package is not 
the obvious way of achieving the desired effects, as the 
effectiveness of the measures seems heavily dependent on 
the detailed recovery plan arrangements, and on circum-
stances such as the situation regarding public ﬁ  nances.
1.2  Empirical results for ﬁ  scal multipliers
There is also a huge volume of empirical literature on the 
effectiveness of an active ﬁ  scal policy designed to support 
demand. This often refers to what are known as the ﬁ  scal 
multipliers, which reﬂ  ect the extent to which a given ﬁ  scal 
stimulus will boost the growth of activity.
However, these studies are not unanimous in their conclu-
sions regarding both the scale of these multipliers and the 
relative effectiveness of the various measures concerning 
revenue and expenditure. In line with the theory, the 
empirical ﬁ  ndings appear to depend largely on the exact 
circumstances, and often also on the model used to assess 
the results. They must therefore be interpreted with the 
greatest caution. Nonetheless, the empirical literature 
does permit a few tentative conclusions.
Although the empirical estimates of the ﬁ  scal  multipli-
ers vary widely in their results, ranging from (Keynesian) 
values of 1 or more to negative values, in most cases they 
are positive, implying that ﬁ   scal recovery measures are 
actually capable of providing a positive boost to economic 
growth. However, most of the studies do indicate ﬁ  scal 
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that should augment the impact of the recovery meas-
ures. Finally, under the said circumstances, it is desirable 
to support economic activity in order to halt the negative 
spiral and curb the hysteresis effects on unemployment.
However, in order to succeed, economic recovery plans 
have to fulﬁ  l certain conditions.
First, the recovery plans must form part of a much wider 
package. In that regard, the absolute priority is to sta-
bilise the ﬁ  nancial system, without which it will in fact 
be impossible to achieve a recovery in the real economy. 
Moreover, ﬁ  scal stimuli are more effective if accompanied 
by a ﬂ  exible monetary policy.
Second, recovery measures obviously need to be timely, 
temporary and targeted – the famous 3 Ts. Another 
requirement might be coordination  : coordinated action 
is desirable because part of the ﬁ  scal stimulus is exported 
via an increase in imports, and is also needed to eliminate 
protectionist reﬂ  exes from national recovery plans. These 
conditions should be considered necessary for ﬁ  scal activ-
ism, but not sufﬁ  cient to ensure its success.
Automatic stabilisers, such as the decline in tax revenues 
and the increase in unemployment beneﬁ  ts  during  an 
economic recession, always satisfy the 3 T criteria. In 
countries where, during a recession, relatively powerful 
automatic stabilisers already ensure a temporary and 
targeted economic recovery, the need to resort to ﬁ  scal 
activism – and the scope available for that purpose – is 
also less than in countries where the automatic stabilisers 
are relatively limited.
Third, wherever possible the recovery package should 
try to facilitate rather than complicate or delay essential 
structural reforms. Nevertheless, it is not always obvious 
how to reconcile such aims with other requirements. From 
that point of view, public investment appears to be the 
best option in terms of ﬁ  scal multipliers and strengthening 
of the economic growth potential, although in practice 
speedy implementation may prove difﬁ  cult.
Finally, it is vital to dispel doubts about the long-term sus-
tainability of public ﬁ  nances. In many European countries, 
including Belgium, that last condition is already imposing 
tight constraints on the scope for far-reaching recovery 
measures – which would impose a heavy burden on the 
budget. Combined with a rather unfavourable initial 
budget situation in some countries, the effect which 
the economic recession exerts on the budget position 
via relatively powerful economic stabilisers has seriously 
damaged the health of public ﬁ  nances in many countries. 
Consequently, there is a danger that it will become even 
multipliers of less than 1, and in many cases the impact of 
a temporary stimulus on economic activity is very limited.
Moreover, the multipliers appear to diverge according to 
the type of stimuli considered. Many studies demonstrate 
that it is temporary increases in consumption and public 
investment that have the greatest positive and immedi-
ate impact on economic activity, although ordinarily that 
effect soon fades. Conversely, in the long term, a cut in 
public revenues seems to be more beneﬁ  cial for economic 
growth than an increase in public expenditure.
Empirical studies also conﬁ  rm that the scale of the liquid-
ity and credit constraints plays a role in the effectiveness 
of a ﬁ  scal stimulatory policy. The greater the number of 
households and businesses facing such constraints, the 
higher the ﬁ  scal multipliers of tax cuts.
It also seems that the impact of recovery measures is 
smaller if the situation regarding public ﬁ  nances – gener-
ally estimated on the basis of the level of public debt or 
its growth – is deteriorating. This is because the recovery 
measures drive up interest rates, depressing private invest-
ment, and because households save more as a precaution 
in times of budget problems.
Finally, the ﬁ   scal multipliers clearly diverge from one 
country to another. Thus, the impact of the recovery 
package tends to be weaker the smaller and more open 
the economy, since a large part of the ﬁ  scal stimulus may 
be exported. Various studies observe smaller multipliers 
for developed economies than for developing economies, 
owing to greater liquidity constraints in the latter. In addi-
tion, studies at national level ﬁ  nd that multipliers in the 
EU Member States are smaller than in the United States.
1.3  What ﬁ  scal policy in response to the crisis ?
The theoretical considerations and empirical ﬁ  ndings 
described above seem to suggest that ﬁ  scal activism is not 
very effective as a way of smoothing out normal cyclical 
ﬂ  uctuations. But the crisis which battered the global econ-
omy in the autumn of 2008 cannot be viewed as a normal 
cyclical slowdown. Given the gravity of the economic situ-
ation and the scale of the associated risks, it seemed right 
to mobilise all possible resources to reverse this situation. 
In that context, ﬁ  scal policy does have a role to play.
Given that the recession could become protracted, it is 
irrelevant to argue that economic recovery plans always 
come too late. Moreover, owing to the recession more 
households and businesses could face liquidity or credit 
constraints than under more normal circumstances, and 
Volledig-E.indb   61 Volledig-E.indb   61 30/09/09   09:27 30/09/09   09:2762
This last plan implies a budgetary cost of 787 billion US 
dollars, or 5.4 p.c. of GDP. Almost 40 p.c. of the amount 
allocated to recovery measures corresponds to tax cuts, 
including a general reduction in personal income tax of 
400 dollars per person. Just under 20 p.c. of this amount 
is to be allocated to aid for the States and local authori-
ties. Finally, just over 40 p.c. will go on expenditure, and 
more particularly on social and federal programmes. 
These programmes focus mainly on infrastructure projects 
and science, protection for vulnerable groups, health care, 
education and training, and energy.
2.2  The European Economic Recovery Plan
A number of national governments in the EU had already 
announced economic recovery plans or had such plans in 
preparation, but it was on 26 November 2008 that the 
EC presented a European framework for the plans. The 
“European Economic Recovery Plan” was approved by 
the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008. It 
provides a common framework for the implementation 
of an active ﬁ  scal policy designed to limit the scale of the 
recession, to stimulate demand and to restore conﬁ  dence. 
This plan provides for a total ﬁ  scal stimulus of 200 bil-
lion euro – or around 1.5 p.c. of the EU’s GDP  –, with 
more problematic to ﬁ  nance the budgetary cost of popu-
lation ageing.
In order to eradicate doubts about the sustainability of 
public ﬁ  nances, it is therefore important for the recovery 
measures to be largely temporary, and for the economic 
policy makers to highlight the prospect of reducing 
budget deﬁ  cits and, preferably, eliminating them as soon 
as the economy reverts to a more normal growth path.
2.  Description of the recovery plans in 
the United States and in Europe
This chapter reviews the various economic recovery plans 
as devised by the United States, and by the European 
Union and its Member States, including Belgium.  (1) It 
concentrates more particularly on the planned increases 
in expenditure and tax cuts, since they have a direct effect 
on the general government budget balance. Conversely, 
this chapter devotes little or no attention to the relatively 
numerous measures taken to support the ﬁ  nancial sector 
and the ﬁ  nancial markets, and other measures which have 
no direct impact on the budget balance.
2.1  The US recovery plan
In addition to the initiatives taken by the Federal Reserve 
via its monetary policy instruments, the American govern-
ment has implemented or approved a number of recovery 
and stabilisation plans in order to limit the impact of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis on the real economy and to support the 
sectors hit by this crisis.  (2)
Thus, in February 2008 Congress approved the Economic 
Stimulus Act, a law comprising measures totalling 168 
billion US dollars to support individuals, ﬁ   rms and the 
mortgage market.
In February 2009 the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act was passed in order to cushion the impact of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis on the real economy and to halt the slump 
in demand. This large-scale recovery plan aims to create 
or safeguard 3 to 4 million jobs – 90 p.c. of them in the 
private sector – via multiple ﬁ  scal stimulus measures. 
(1)  This article does not consider the plans adopted in other countries, even though 
their scale is sometimes considerable. For instance, in China, according to IMF 
data published in April 2009, discretionary measures relating to 2007 represented 
a cumulative budgetary cost amounting to 0.4 p.c. of GDP in 2008, 3.1 p.c. of 
GDP in 2009 and 2.7 p.c. of GDP in 2010. The corresponding ﬁ  gures for Russia 
are 0 p.c. of GDP in 2008, 4.1 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 1.3 p.c. of GDP in 2010, 
and for Japan 0.3 p.c. of GDP in 2008, 2.4 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 1.8 p.c. of 
GDP in 2010.
(2)  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (October 2008) and the Financial 
Stability Plan (February 2009) include measures designed to restore liquidity and 
stability on the US ﬁ  nancial markets and to recapitalise a number of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (and certain vehicle manufacturing groups).
TABLE 1  RECOVERY MEASURES IN THE UNITED STATES  : 
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
(billions of US dollars, unless otherwise stated)
 
Tax cuts  (1)  ................................. 288
Tax cuts in favour of States and local 
authorities  (2)  ............................... 144
Infrastructure and science   .................... 111
Protection for vulnerable groups  .............. 81
Health care  ................................ 59
Education and training  ...................... 53
Energy  .................................... 43
Other  ..................................... 8
  Total  .....................................     787
p.m. As a percentage of GDP  ................   5.4
Source :  www.recovery.gov.
(1) Of which 15 billion US dollars for infrastructure and science, 61 billion for 
the protection of vulnerable groups, 25 billion for education and training and 
22 billion for energy. Altogether, the funds allocated thus total 126 billion for 
infrastructure and science, 142 billion for the protection of vulnerable groups, 
78 billion for education and training and 65 billion for energy.
(2) These tax reductions aim to prevent any cut-backs in expenditure on health care 
and education and tax increases on the part of States and local authorities.
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Finally, the recovery measures must ﬁ  t into the framework 
deﬁ  ned by the Stability and Growth Pact, which lays down 
the rules of ﬁ  scal discipline to be respected by the EU 
Member States. The European Economic Recovery Plan 
provides for “judicious” application of that pact, ensuring 
the establishment of ﬁ  scal strategies with medium-term 
credibility. Thus, the existence of exceptional circum-
stances combining a ﬁ  nancial crisis with a recession justi-
ﬁ   es the immediate implementation of a recovery plan, 
even if that may cause some Member States to exceed the 
deﬁ  cit reference value of 3 p.c. of GDP. Member States 
were asked to submit an updated stability or convergence 
programme. That updating should clarify the measures 
to be adopted to compensate for the deterioration in 
the budget and guarantee the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances.
Regarding the excessive deﬁ   cit procedure, the EC has 
to produce a report in all cases where the public deﬁ  cit 
exceeds the reference value of 3 p.c. of GDP.  (1) A deﬁ  cit 
is called excessive if it fails to satisfy the following three 
conditions simultaneously : the excess must be temporary, 
limited, and due to exceptional circumstances. A cor-
rection procedure is then launched in accordance with 
the rules laid down by the pact. The EC has stated that, 
although the current circumstances are clearly excep-
tional, it is unlikely that the deﬁ  cits expected in excess of 
the reference value in many Member States can satisfy the 
other two conditions, so that the pact offers little scope 
for avoiding the launch of the excessive deﬁ  cit procedure 
against the Member States concerned.
Conversely, the EC drew attention to the great ﬂ  exibility 
which has existed since the 2005 reform in regard to the 
implementation of this procedure, especially concern-
ing the time allowed and the structural budget effort 
required to correct the excessive deﬁ  cit. Thus, in speciﬁ  c 
circumstances, the period is set at two years – instead of 
one year – following identiﬁ  cation of the excessive deﬁ  cit, 
and the EC has drawn attention to precedents in which 
even more ﬂ  exible periods applied. Moreover, that period 
may be extended in the event of unexpected economic 
developments which have a very adverse effect on public 
ﬁ  nances. Finally, the EC stated that under the pact the 
Ecoﬁ  n Council calls on Member States with an excessive 
public deﬁ  cit to make an annual structural budget effort 
representing at least 0.5 p.c. of GDP, which is regarded 
as the reference value, and that the scale of the budget 
effort required can therefore be adjusted in line with 
exceptional circumstances.
Member States contributing 170 billion euro in the form 
of ﬁ   scal measures, and the European Investment Bank 
providing 30 billion via increased lending.
The recovery plan does not propose any speciﬁ  c allocation 
of measures among the Member States. However, the EC 
stated that account should be taken of the initial situation 
of the various Member States, and of the fact that they 
did not all have the same ﬁ  scal room for manoeuvre. 
According to the European Economic Recovery Plan, the 
proposed ﬁ   scal stimuli must be carefully designed and 
based on a number of principles. 
First, the recovery measures must satisfy the 3 T criteria  : 
they must be timely, temporary and targeted. According 
to the EC’s interpretation, this last condition means that 
the recovery measures must target the source of the eco-
nomic problem – unemployment, credit constraints facing 
households and businesses, and support for structural 
reforms – in order to maximise the stabilisation effect 
produced by limited budget resources.  
Next, the recovery measures must combine instruments 
affecting both revenue and expenditure. However, the 
EC pointed out that increases in consumption and public 
investment generally had a greater inﬂ  uence on demand 
than tax cuts, since some consumers may prefer to set 
aside the amount saved from lower taxes. In that context 
the European Economic Recovery Plan draws up a list 
of measures which may provide a ﬁ  scal stimulus. Thus, 
expenditure may be increased, either by measures to 
support the households hardest hit by the crisis – such 
as an increase in beneﬁ  ts  for  low-income  households 
or the unemployed, and a temporary extension of the 
unemployment beneﬁ  t period – or by bringing forward 
investment projects which may be advantageous for SMEs 
or may support long-term political goals. Guarantees and 
subsidies in the form of loans may also help to alleviate 
the shortage of credit. Other possibilities include ﬁ  nan-
cial incentives to speed up the adjustment of economies 
facing long-term challenges, and more particularly, to 
promote energy efﬁ  ciency. Reductions in taxes and social 
security contributions for both businesses and households 
may strengthen demand for labour and boost purchasing 
power. Finally, temporary reductions in the rate of VAT 
may support private consumption.
The ﬁ  scal stimuli also need to be accompanied by struc-
tural reforms within the broader context of the Lisbon 
strategy, which aims in particular to raise the employment 
rate and create a knowledge-based economy.
(1)  Under Article 104 § 3 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
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Only part of this support is attributable to discretionary 
recovery measures. These comprise all measures adopted 
or announced since the autumn of 2008 which may be 
regarded as a ﬁ  scal response to the economic recession. 
Thus, the impact on the budget balance of the measures 
approved or announced by EU Member States comes 
to over 135 billion euro (1.1 p.c. of GDP) for the EU as 
a whole in 2009. That impact will decline to 90 billion 
(0.7 p.c. of GDP) in 2010. It is possible to obtain an 
approximation of this discretionary component via the 
change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance, which 
is often used as an indicator of the ﬁ  scal policy stance.  (1)
Turning to the medium-term goals of ﬁ  scal policy, the EC 
states that, as potential growth will probably be revised 
downwards, the same will apply to the structural budget 
balances. In that context, the deadline for achieving the 
medium-term objectives speciﬁ   c to each country could 
also be reviewed case by case.
2.3  The recovery plans of the EU Member States
2.3.1 General
Total ﬁ  scal support for economic activity
In line with the European Economic Recovery Plan, the 
governments of most EU Member States took measures 
to stimulate economic activity. The latest information from 
the EC indicates that the total ﬁ  scal policy support for 
economic activity in the EU amounts to around 5 p.c. of 
GDP in 2009 and 2010 together.
(1)  The change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance does not necessarily tally 
with the scale of the ﬁ  scal measures designed to stimulate economic activity, as 
laid down in the recovery plans. That discrepancy is due partly to discretionary 
measures which are not recorded in the recovery plans, and partly to technical 

























































































Deterioration in the cyclically adjusted budget balance
Of which :
Increase in the budget deficit
Estimated effect of the automatic stabilisers
CHART 1  TOTAL FISCAL SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1)
  (percentages of GDP, cumulative effect over 2009 and 2010)
Source : EC.
(1)  Excluding the financial sector support measures (such as recapitalisations and provision of liquidity) and guarantees granted to the private sector.
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Scale of the recovery plans
The scale of the recovery plans as identiﬁ  ed by the EC 
varies greatly from one EU Member State to another. 
In Spain, Austria, Finland, Malta, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, the scale of the recovery plans for 
2009 exceeds the norm of 1.2 p.c. of GDP proposed by 
the EC. In contrast, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, France and the Netherlands are very close to 
the European average of 1 p.c. of GDP. In Belgium, the 
recovery measures look limited in comparison with those 
adopted by all these countries, since they amount to only 
0.5 and 0.4 p.c. of GDP respectively in 2009 and 2010. 
However, in a number of EU Member States the measures 
adopted have had little or no impact on the budget. That 
is true, for instance, of the Baltic States and of several east 
European countries – Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania –, 
and of some southern European countries such as Cyprus, 
Italy and Greece.
The differences in terms of the scale of the EU Member 
States’ recovery plans are in line with the European 
Economic Recovery Plan’s call for the initial budget posi-
tion of each country to be taken into account in devis-
ing these plans. Moreover, the EC has tried to examine 
the extent to which the EU Member States had in fact 
taken that point into account. For that purpose, it 
compared the scale of the national recovery plans to 
a budget margin indicator developed by its staff. That 
indicator refers to a country’s capacity to ﬁ  nance  the 
desired ﬁ  scal programmes in the short, medium and long 
term, and to honour its creditors without jeopardising 
macroeconomic stability and the sustainability of public 
ﬁ  nances.  (1)
On the basis of that indicator, the EC divided the EU 
Member States into three groups according to whether 
their budget room for manoeuvre was large, medium or 
small. In view of the highly complicated method of calcu-
lating this indicator, the results must be interpreted with 
caution. Belgium belongs to the group of countries with 
medium room for manoeuvre.
In general, the Member States with greater budget room 
for manoeuvre seem to have adopted more recovery 
measures than those which have less scope. More spe-
ciﬁ  cally, the measures adopted by countries with ample 
budget room for manoeuvre represent, on average 
1.3 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 1.7 p.c. in 2010, whereas 
the corresponding ﬁ  gures for those years in countries with 
average budget room for manoeuvre are around 1 and 
0.2 p.c. of GDP respectively. On the other hand, countries 
with limited budget room for manoeuvre have made little 
or no use of recovery measures.
In addition, the budget’s automatic reaction to the eco-
nomic recession should play a considerable role in Europe. 
More speciﬁ  cally, the effect of the automatic stabilisers 
over 2009 and 2010 is estimated at around 3.2 p.c. of 
GDP. That is an average ﬁ  gure, since the effect of the 
automatic stabilisers varies greatly from one country to 
another, given the divergences in terms of factors such as 
the tax burden and the progress of the economic cycle. 
This ﬁ  gure should also be treated with caution since the 
difﬁ   culties which already arise under ordinary circum-
stances in distinguishing between automatic ﬂ  uctuations 
in the budget balance and discretionary adjustments are 
heightened by the exceptional character of the current 
situation.
In the EU, the total ﬁ  scal support for economic activity 
is likely to cause the budget balance to deteriorate by 
around 5 percentage points, creating a deﬁ   cit of over 
7 p.c. of GDP in 2010. In the euro area, the budget bal-
ance is set to deteriorate by 4.5 percentage points, pro-
ducing a deﬁ  cit of 6.5 p.c. of GDP in 2010.
Measures in favour of the ﬁ  nancial sector are disregarded 
in the EC’s estimate of total ﬁ   scal support mentioned 
above, although they will obviously play a vital role in 
overcoming the current crisis. Moreover, the EU Member 
States have also taken a series of measures which have 
no impact on the general government budget balance. 
This mainly concerns loans and capital injections for non-
ﬁ   nancial corporations, the early reimbursement of VAT, 
and the increase in investments by public enterprises.
Comparison of the various ﬁ  scal policy responses in terms 
of both the scale and the content of the total ﬁ  scal sup-
port reveals notable differences between EU Member 
States. That ﬁ  nding is also true of the recovery plans. The 
following section concentrates on the scale and content 
of those plans. Differences concerning the action of the 
automatic stabilisers are not examined. However, it should 
be noted that the normal action of these stabilisers is an 
essential element of the total ﬁ  scal support for economic 
activity. As already stated, in most EU Member States the 
contribution of the automatic stabilisers exceeds that of 
the discretionary measures contained in the economic 
recovery plans.
(1)  The indicator is based on six variables, namely : gross public debt, the implicit 
debt of the ﬁ  nancial sector – calculated on the basis of the outstanding domestic 
debt of the private sector and a risk factor –, the potential medium-term 
adverse impact on revenues generated by corporation tax and capital taxes, the 
current balance, non-discretionary expenditure – essentially interest charges and 
pensions – and a sustainability indicator.
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adopted other measures aimed, in particular, at facilitat-
ing access to credit, reinforcing the liquidity position of 
ﬁ  rms, stimulating private investment in R&D and energy 
efﬁ  ciency, assisting certain speciﬁ  c sectors (such as the car 
industry and the property market), and establishing an 
active labour market policy.
The recovery measures taken at the scale of the EU and 
the euro area are evenly balanced between expenditure 
and revenue. Of the total discretionary recovery measures, 
which amount to 1.1 p.c. of GDP in 2009, just under half 
(0.5 p.c. of GDP) concern expenditure while just over 
half (0.6 p.c. of GDP) concern revenue. In most of the 
EU Member States, there is a balanced mix of measures 
affecting expenditure and revenue. However, a number of 
countries, namely Finland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Austria, the United Kingdom and Poland, have focused 
most of their measures on revenues. Conversely, the 
opposite is true for Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Portugal and 
Slovenia.
Content of the recovery plans
The recovery plans adopted by the EU Member States 
comprise a range of measures. Over half of the EU 
Member States have reduced the ﬁ   scal and paraﬁ  scal 
burden on labour, measures which are likely to have a 
major impact on the budget in a number of countries. 
Under half of the Member States have adopted measures 
concerning taxes on corporate proﬁ  ts. VAT cuts are less 
common : the United Kingdom is the only country to have 
made a substantial general, but temporary, reduction in 
VAT. Cyprus, Finland, Austria and Belgium resorted to 
sectoral cuts in VAT. Those cuts concerned the following 
branches of activity respectively  : tourism, food, pharma-
ceuticals and construction. Most of the EU Member States 
endeavoured to stimulate investments in public infrastruc-
ture. Rather than new initiatives, most of these meas-
ures concern infrastructure projects which were already 
planned and have been brought forward. Over half of 
the EU Member States have adjusted social beneﬁ  ts (pen-
sions, family allowances and unemployment beneﬁ  ts). 
In the majority of countries, these measures have little 















































































































































CHART 2  SCALE OF THE RECOVERY PLANS
  (percentages of GDP)
Source : EC.
(1)  The figures indicate the change between 2008 and 2010. They therefore take account of permanent measures which came into force in 2009 and the net effect of 
measures planned for 2010.
(2) Weighted  average.
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Germany
Germany has the most ambitious recovery plan of all the 
EU Member States, in terms of both percentage of GDP     
except Austria – and billions of euro. The EC estimated 
the budgetary cost at around 3.3 p.c. of GDP over 2009 
and 2010 together. More speciﬁ  cally, the impact on the 
budget is assessed at 1.4 p.c. of GDP in 2009, rising to 
1.9 p.c. of GDP in 2010.
This discretionary support largely takes the form of a 
reduction in the charges imposed on labour. There are 
also plans for a fundamental reform of corporation tax, 
and substantial public investment in infrastructure has 
been announced. In addition, a 2,500 euro allowance is 
granted in cases where a car over 9 years old is replaced 
by a more ecological vehicle. Only one-third of the pur-
chases resulting from this measure concern German-made 
cars, so that there are signiﬁ  cant spill-over effects for for-
eign car makers. The other measures include in particular 
reinforcement of the employment activation policy, exten-
sion of the temporary lay-offs system, a structural, one-
off increase in family allowances, reintroduction of more 
Effect of the recovery plans on economic growth
It is uncertain how the recovery plans will affect economic 
growth, as estimating the ﬁ  scal multipliers entails making 
a number of strong assumptions. On the basis of its eco-
nomic model, Quest III, and assuming a serious shortage 
of liquidity for households, the EC estimated that the 
European recovery measures would contribute 0.8 per-
centage point to GDP growth in 2009 and 0.3 percentage 
point in 2010.  (1)
2.3.2   Recovery measures adopted by certain EU Member 
States
This section examines in more detail the recovery meas-
ures adopted by countries bordering Belgium. It also com-
ments on the recovery plans set up in the United Kingdom 
and Spain, as they are relatively substantial in scale.































Levies on labour   ..............   X xx x  X   X   X   X xx
Corporation tax  .............. x x   X x  X x
V A T   ........................ x x x   X
Public infrastructure  (2)  ......... xxxxx  X   X x  X x  X xx
Social beneﬁts  ............... xxxx x xx x   X




























Levies on labour   ..............   X   X xxx xx  X x
Corporation tax  ..............   X x  X x  X x
V A T   ........................   X
Public infrastructure  (2)  ......... x x   X xx  X x  X xx x
Social beneﬁts  ............... x   X x xxx x
Other  ....................... x x   X xxxxxx  X xxx
Source :  EC.
(1) This table was produced using an EC database which records various recovery measures adopted by EU countries. It does not include some more recent measures, such as 
the reduction in VAT in the hotel and catering trade in France.
(2) A minority of measures concerning the public infrastructure consist of new initiatives. In other words, most of them relate to projects which had already been planned and 
were brought forward.
X  Big impact on the budget (≥ 0.2 p.c. of GDP).
x  Small or unspeciﬁed impact on the budget.
 
(1) These  ﬁ  gures are based on discretionary stimuli amounting to 1 p.c. of GDP in 
2009 and 0.5 p.c. of GDP in 2010, corresponding overall to the scale of the 
European recovery plans.
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abolish the tax on airline tickets. In addition, household 
purchasing power is being boosted by the reduction in 
unemployment insurance contributions. There is also 
sectoral support for the social housing market and sup-
port for the car industry, via payment of an allowance for 
the replacement of an old vehicle. In addition, speciﬁ  c 
measures to combat unemployment have been adopted, 
such as the introduction of a system of temporary lay-
offs. Investments in public infrastructure have also been 
announced, mainly the acceleration of projects already 
planned. Finally, there are government guarantees to 
encourage lending to SMEs.
Luxembourg
The recovery plan adopted by Luxembourg comprises 
measures amounting to 2.6 p.c. of GDP. The impact on 
the budget is estimated at 1.2 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 
1.4 p.c. in 2010.
The recovery measures consist largely of tax cuts and a 
signiﬁ  cant increase in public investment. In order to sup-
port household purchasing power, the personal income 
tax scales have been index-linked, pensions have been 
increased by 2 p.c., and there are plans for a reform 
which will extend the tax credit for dependent children. 
Corporation tax has been cut from 22 to 21 p.c., and the 
tax on capital increases has been abolished. In addition, 
struggling ﬁ   rms may qualify for a special support pro-
gramme and SMEs may be eligible for increased subsidies. 
The Luxembourg recovery plan also provides for labour 
market support via an incentive to resort to temporary 
lay-offs, with refund of the employer’s contribution to 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts, extension of the period covered 
and increased beneﬁ  ts for workers who attend training. 
Finally, there is a package of “green” measures, designed 
to promote environment-friendly cars and eco-energy 
consumption.
United Kingdom
The EC estimates the impact of the United Kingdom’s 
recovery plan at 1.4 p.c. of GDP. All the impact on the 
budget will be felt in 2009.
The main measure is the temporary reduction in the rate 
of VAT from 17.5 to 15 p.c. in 2009. Other measures 
include the acceleration of public investment in infrastruc-
ture and a one-off tax reduction of 130 pounds sterling 
per person in 2009, in addition to the £600 granted in 
May 2008. There are also some measures to reinforce 
the active employment policy, support for the residential 
property market and an increase in family allowances 
and pensions linked to prosperity. By analogy with the 
ﬂ  exible rules on depreciation for businesses to encourage 
them to invest, reinstatement of the tax allowance for 
commuters, and a steeper increase in pensions and social 
beneﬁ  ts in the context of rising unemployment. Finally, 
there is the implementation of a programme of loans and 
guarantees for businesses amounting to 100 billion euro, 
although this measure has no impact on the general gov-
ernment budget balance.
France
The French recovery plan is less extensive than the German 
plan. The EC estimates its budget impact at 0.9 p.c. of 
GDP, namely 0.8 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 0.1 p.c. in 2010.
The plan boosts the purchasing power of low-income 
households by payment of a solidarity bonus of 200 euro 
per household, and by tax cuts and tax exemption. In con-
trast to the German recovery plan, a reduction in charges 
on labour is not a key component of the French recovery 
plan. Although the employers’ contributions payable by 
SMEs recruiting unemployed persons have been reduced, 
the budget impact of this measure is small. In order to 
support the labour market, the employment activation 
policy is also being reinforced. In addition, the French 
economy is being revitalised by substantial investment in 
infrastructure projects, such as the renovation of univer-
sity campuses. Business investment is also being encour-
aged by tax exemptions. Furthermore, there is sectoral 
support for the car industry, in the form of a 1,000 euro 
allowance in cases where an old car is replaced by a new 
one, and substantial loans for car makers, and support 
for the property sector by the doubling of the amount on 
which a zero-rate loan can be arranged for the purchase 
of a new home and by increased ﬁ  nance for housing con-
struction. Finally, aid is being granted to French ﬁ  rms via 
numerous measures geared to liquidity, and a programme 
intended to support lending to SMEs has been set up, 
but these measures have no direct impact on the general 
government budget balance.
Netherlands
The EC estimates the overall budget cost of the Dutch 
recovery plan at 1.9 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 2010. The 
discretionary support is put at around 0.9 p.c. of GDP in 
2009 and 1 p.c. of GDP in 2010. 
The measures mainly affect public revenues. For instance, 
there are measures concerning corporation tax, par-
ticularly via an adjustment to the depreciation rules, 
and measures concerning social security contributions 
and personal income tax. It was also decided to cancel 
the planned 1 percentage point increase in VAT and to 
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beneﬁ  ts and an extension of the payroll tax reductions 
granted by the federal and Flemish governments. The 
measures taken under the federal and regional recovery 
plans come to 0.5 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 0.4 p.c. in 
2010.
The main recurrent budgetary costs associated with the 
supplementary recovery measures are due to the exten-
sion of the payroll tax reductions for ﬁ  rms, amounting to 
482 million euro in 2009 and 1.1 billion in 2010. Thus, the 
reductions in charges on shift work and night work have 
been extended with effect from 1 June 2009. The number 
of overtime hours qualifying for exemption has also been 
increased, and the general reduction in payroll tax was 
extended in June 2009, and will be extended again in 
January 2010. Finally, the percentage of the payroll tax 
reduction applicable to researchers has been increased.
In addition, to counteract the repercussions of the crisis, 
the government adopted a series of speciﬁ  c  measures 
which also have a permanent impact on the budget bal-
ance. For instance, the purchasing power of workers who 
have been temporarily laid off was boosted by a simulta-
neous increase in both the unemployment beneﬁ  t reim-
bursement rates and the calculation ceiling. Moreover, 
the tax discrimination affecting married persons who are 
temporarily laid off has been eliminated, and subject to 
certain conditions, it is now easier for agency workers to 
claim beneﬁ  ts.
The recovery plans include only a small number of meas-
ures having a temporary impact on the budget balance. 
The federal government and the regions are trying to 
speed up the rate of their own investments. Also, the 
rate of VAT on the construction of new family housing 
has been cut from 21 to 6 p.c. on the ﬁ  rst 50,000 euro 
tranche. The VAT rate has also been cut from 12 to 6 p.c. 
for the construction of public social housing. Finally, a 
one-off reduction of 30 euro on electricity bills has been 
granted to all households in 2009, costing the govern-
ment an estimated 135 million euro.
The above measures form just part of the response by the 
federal and regional governments to the crisis. The fed-
eral government has in fact also provided support for the 
ﬁ  nancial sector. In addition, it has adopted considerable 
measures to preserve the liquidity position of businesses 
and self-employed persons, e.g. by postponing the dates 
for payment of VAT, social contributions and payroll tax, 
recovery plans adopted in Germany and France, there is a 
£2,000 allowance for the purchase of a new car provided 
it replaces an old vehicle. Finally, a number of measures 
also aim to support lending to small businesses and to the 
car industry.
Spain
Like Germany, Spain has set up a relatively ambitious 
recovery plan compared to the other EU Member States. 
The EC considers that the Spanish recovery measures will 
have a budgetary cost of 2.9 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 
2010. Most of that will be felt in 2009, at 2.3 p.c. of GDP. 
In 2010, the budgetary impact of the Spanish recovery 
plan will drop to 0.6 p.c. of GDP.
A substantial part of the ﬁ  scal stimulus concerns invest-
ment in public infrastructure projects. A number of ﬁ  scal 
measures have also been adopted, such as a one-off, 
signiﬁ  cant tax reduction of 400 euro per taxpayer, and 
the abolition of the wealth tax. In addition, households 
struggling to repay their mortgage loan are being granted 
guarantees. The car industry is also receiving speciﬁ  c aid. 
Moreover, to reduce unemployment employers are being 
granted exemption from social security contributions 
when taking on new employees. Finally, businesses, and 
especially SMEs, are receiving support in the form of loans 
and early reimbursement of VAT.
2.4  The Belgian recovery plan
Following the European Economic Recovery Plan, the 
federal government presented the broad outline of the 
Belgian recovery plan on 11 December 2008. In addition, 
the regions announced supplementary recovery measures.
The budgetary measures taken by the federal government 
to revive economic activity aim mainly to breathe new life 
into ﬁ  rms, to boost purchasing power and to safeguard 
jobs. The measures leading to the conclusion of the cen-
tral agreement for 2009  2010 were incorporated in the 
recovery plan, which also aims to strengthen sustainable 
socio-economic leverage and investment in the environ-
mental sphere. However, the budget resources earmarked 
for this last item are very limited. The budget expenditure 
of the regions is estimated to increase by only around 
0.1 p.c. of GDP in 2009, as a result of the acceleration of 
investment projects already planned.
The effect on the budget balances of the whole series of 
discretionary measures comes to 0.9 p.c. of GDP in both 
2009 and 2010.  (1) It essentially covers measures which 
had already been adopted, in particular increases in social 
(1)  The federal government also included in the recovery plan the effect of the 
indexation of personal income tax scales for 2009 (costing 1.2 billion euro). 
According to the methodology used by the Bank and by the EC, this is not 
regarded as a measure (though conversely, the non-indexation might be regarded 
as such). Its effect is therefore disregarded here.
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ﬁ  scal support in the two economies. For that purpose it 
is necessary to take account of the differences in terms 
of automatic stabilisers. In the EU, the budgetary sup-
port via the economic stabilisers is put at 3.2 p.c. of GDP, 
representing considerably more than the support provided 
via the recovery plans. In the United States, the stabilisers 
play a much more modest role, as the ﬁ  scal pressure is less 
there. Moreover, the absence of a strong social security 
safety net is a powerful argument in favour of a stronger 
ﬁ  scal stimulus in the United States. Also, past experience 
has shown that in the United States there is a culture of 
large-scale ﬁ  scal intervention in times of crisis, at least to 
a much greater extent than in Europe.
Timely, temporary and targeted ?
It is difﬁ  cult to judge whether the European recovery plans 
are sufﬁ  ciently timely. All things considered, the govern-
ment response has been relatively swift. Admittedly, there 
was some delay between the start of the economic crisis 
and its recognition, and between the decision on the 
recovery plans and their eventual implementation, but 
those delays were more or less inevitable. Past experience 
indicates that serious ﬁ  nancial crises are often accompa-
nied by protracted economic recessions. If the current 
recession also proves persistent, the measures will have 
been taken in good time, or at least, they will not be 
procyclical. The measures concerning investments seem 
to be geared mainly towards speeding up projects which 
have already been planned, rather than new investments. 
In Belgium, the measures which have the greatest impact 
on the budget balance, namely the reduction in payroll 
tax and the adjustment in line with prosperity, were not 
implemented until the second half of 2009. The tempo-
rary measures and the injection of liquidity were imple-
mented promptly and could make a very effective contri-
bution towards limiting the impact of adverse economic 
growth and helping viable companies faced with liquidity 
problems to get through the most difﬁ  cult period.
The recovery plans of the various EU Member States are 
not all temporary. While those of some countries, such 
as the United Kingdom, are genuinely temporary, that is 
barely true – if at all – in other countries. Belgium belongs 
to this last category of countries. The recovery measures 
there are very largely permanent, mainly on account of 
the measures taken under the central agreement.
Finally, it is hard to assess the extent to which the inter-
ventions are targeted, notably because the criterion in 
question is vague. Be that as it may, a broad range of 
measures have been adopted. In Belgium, the measures 
appear to be partly targeted, e.g. in the case of those 
combating unemployment, providing ﬁ  nancial resources 
or by early reimbursement of VAT. Moreover, the regional 
plans place a large volume of funds at the disposal of non-
ﬁ  nancial corporations via regional investment companies. 
Nonetheless, taken together, these measures do not in 
principle imply any associated direct effect on the overall 
balance of general government.
3.  Comments on the recovery plans
This chapter sets out some general thoughts on the 
economic recovery plans. It focuses ﬁ   rst on the differ-
ences between the United States and Europe, and then 
examines the extent to which the European recovery 
measures satisfy the 3 Ts. Finally, it draws attention to 
the scale of the risks associated with the current wave of 
ﬁ  scal activism.
Differences between the United States and Europe
The US economic recovery plan is far more extensive 
than that of the EU. In speciﬁ  c terms, the budgetary cost 
of the American plan cumulated over 2009 and 2010 is 
estimated at 5.4 p.c. of GDP, while the European plan is 
expected to cost only 1.8 p.c. of GDP. However, these 
ﬁ  gures do not provide an accurate picture of the total 
TABLE 3  MAIN RECOVERY MEASURES IN BELGIUM  (1)






  Permanent measures  ...............   1,869   2,821
Measures already adopted  ............ 1,242 1,570
Payroll tax reductions  (2)  ............... 482 1,115
Increase in temporary lay-off beneﬁts   ... 100 103
Other  .............................. 45 33
  Temporary measures  ...............   1,140   153
Reduced rate of VAT in construction  . . . 300 0
Measures adopted by the regions   ...... 150 0
Acceleration of public investment  ...... 146 153
Reduction in electricity bills  ........... 165 0
Other  .............................. 379 0
  Total recovery measures  ............   3,009   2,974
p.m. As a percentage of GDP  .........     0.9     0.9
Sources  : FPS Finance, budget documents.
(1) This only concerns measures having a direct effect on the general government 
budget balance.
(2) For shift work and night work, overtime and general reduction.
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effect of the ﬁ  scal stimulus would be to drive up the sav-
ings ratio without boosting expenditure – and there could 
be a steep increase in interest rate spreads, and hence 
interest charges.
It is therefore vital for the recovery measures to be tem-
porary as far as possible. It is also crucial that economic 
policy makers should emphasise the prospect of budget 
deﬁ  cits being radically reduced, if not eliminated, as soon 
as the economy reverts to a more normal growth path.
In that connection, it should be stressed that, in a report 
on the European Economic Recovery Plan, submitted to 
the European Council on 18 and 19 June 2009, the Ecoﬁ  n 
Council estimated on the basis of the economic and 
budgetary forecasts that new ﬁ  scal stimuli were not nec-
essary and that the focus should be moved towards ﬁ  scal 
consolidation, as the economic recovery strengthens.
for ﬁ  rms and households facing liquidity problems, and 
stimulating structural reforms. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that only a very small number of measures con-
cern public investment, in particular because the federal 
government no longer has any substantial powers in 
that area. The major part of the cost of the plan directly 
beneﬁ   ts households and businesses as a whole, in the 
hope that this will give them more scope for consump-
tion and investment. However, in an adverse economic 
period when the conﬁ  dence of consumers and producers 
is weak, it is likely that a substantial proportion of these 
resources will be held as savings, and consequently not 
allocated to consumption or investment.
Risks associated with the current wave of ﬁ  scal activism
In recent decades a consensus has emerged whereby 
sound and sustainable public ﬁ   nances are one of the 
keystones of a culture of stability geared to sustainable 
long-term growth. In the EU, and more particularly in the 
euro area, a responsible ﬁ  scal policy is in principle imposed 
by the ﬁ  scal rules of the stability and growth pact. From 
that perspective, it should probably be pointed out that, 
since the introduction of the euro, some countries have not 
always adhered strictly to those rules, and have not taken 
sufﬁ  cient advantage of favourable periods in previous years 
to achieve a structural improvement in their ﬁ  scal policy.
The wave of ﬁ   scal activism born of the economic and 
ﬁ  nancial crisis is not without its risks. According to the 
latest EC estimate, as a result of the crisis the EU’s budget 
deﬁ  cit is expected to reach 7.3 p.c. of GDP in 2010, with a 
debt ratio of 73.9 p.c. of GDP in that year. In the euro area, 
the public deﬁ  cit is put at 6.5 p.c. of GDP in 2010, while 
the debt ratio will climb to 83.9 p.c. of GDP. According to 
the OECD, the public deﬁ  cit in the United States is likely 
to reach 10.8 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and 11.8 p.c. in 2010, 
driving up the debt ratio to almost 100 p.c. In view of 
the scale of the public deﬁ  cits, the public debt is liable to 
expand considerably in the ensuing years.
The challenge which all the national governments must 
address concerns ﬁ  nding the right balance between, on 
the one hand, the need to revive the economy in the 
short term and the desire to achieve that by adopting 
ﬁ  scal measures, and on the other hand, the sustainability 
of public ﬁ  nances. In that regard, it must be remembered 
that in the coming years many countries will face the 
impact of population ageing on public ﬁ  nances.
That said, it is vital to dispel doubts about the long-term 
sustainability of public ﬁ  nances, especially as they thwart 
the desired effect of the recovery plans. Otherwise, non-
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CHART 3  PUBLIC FINANCE PROJECTIONS
  (percentages of GDP)
Sources : EC, OECD.
(1)  Consolidated gross public debt.
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Conclusion
The economic recovery plans are a key element of the 
wide range of measures adopted by the economic policy 
makers worldwide in response to the ﬁ  nancial crisis and 
the economic recession. The aim is of course laudable, 
but is it really achievable  ? While the recovery measures 
may indeed attenuate the economic recession in the 
short term, their effect is uncertain and could be relatively 
limited. The recovery plans cannot have the optimum 
short-term impact on economic growth unless certain 
conditions are met. An essential condition is that doubts 
over the long-term sustainability of public ﬁ  nances must 
be dispelled.
Combined with an initial budget position which is already 
weak in some countries, however, the economic recovery 
plans and the effect which the economic recession is 
exerting on the budget position via the relatively power-
ful automatic stabilisers have seriously impaired the health 
of public ﬁ  nances in a good many countries. It therefore 
seems that most European countries, including Belgium, 
no longer have any scope to adopt effective additional 
recovery measures. Conversely, there is now a need for 
clear and reliable strategies heralding a return to sound 
and sustainable public ﬁ  nances.
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